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REPLACEMENT OR REDUCTION OF GENE-
EDITED ANIMALS IN BIOMEDICAL 
RESEARCH: A COMPARATIVE ETHICS AND 
POLICY ANALYSIS* 
MATTHIAS EGGEL** & REBECCA L. WALKER*** 
Since William Bateson’s 1906 coinage of the term “genetics,” the 
rise of mice as a model organism for biomedical research has 
gone hand in hand with genomic developments. In today’s 
research environment, mice and rats make up the vast majority of 
all research subjects. While the advent of gene-editing tools such 
as CRISPR has made genetic manipulation of mice easier, these 
tools also signal a new trend toward an increased use of large-
animal models such as dogs, pigs, and nonhuman primates. 
Especially for neurological impairments, CRISPR gene editing 
offers the potential to generate large-animal models that better 
mimic human diseases. What are the ethical and regulatory 
implications of this trend? The professional and ethical 
framework for responsible conduct of animal research is widely 
recognized as the “three Rs”: Reduction, Refinement, and 
Replacement. This Article points to the tension between 
reduction (decreasing the overall numbers of animals used) and 
relative replacement (the use of mice and rats instead of species 
with more “complex” capacities) that is implied by such a trade-
off. The Article argues, however, that a comparative analysis of 
regulatory frameworks in the United States and in the European 
Union shows that neither offers any substantial guidance to 
moderate a trend toward greater use of large-animal models. 
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Nevertheless, we raise several ethical questions associated with 
the trend toward using relatively fewer animals but replacing less 
cognitively developed animals with those with potentially greater 
morally relevant capacities and moral standing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In today’s biomedical research environment, mice and rats 
account for the vast majority of animals used.1 While the advent of 
new gene-editing tools such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short 
 
 1. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL 
AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: SEVENTH REPORT ON THE STATISTICS ON THE 
NUMBER OF ANIMALS USED FOR EXPERIMENTAL AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES IN 
THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 3 (2013), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
resource.html?uri=cellar:e99d2a56-32fc-4f60-ad69-61ead7e377e8.0001.03/DOC_1&format=
PDF [https://perma.cc/72B2-JF85]. Because only some countries collect statistics on the 
numbers of animals used generally, and rodents in particular, estimates of actual 
percentages of mice and rats vary as compared to other mammals. Katy Taylor et al., 
Estimates for Worldwide Laboratory Animal Use in 2005, 36 HUMANE SOC’Y INST. FOR 
SCI. & POL’Y ANIMAL STUD. REPOSITORY 327, 327–28 (2008).  
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Palindromic Repeats (“CRISPR”) paired with specific nucleases (e.g., 
Cas) has made genetic manipulation of mice easier, they also portend 
a new trend toward an increased use of large-animal models such as 
dogs, pigs, and nonhuman primates (“NHPs”), among others.2 These 
gene-editing tools offer the potential to generate large-animal models 
that better mimic human diseases and are thus potentially more 
translatable to human medicine.3 
The responsible conduct of animal research has largely been 
based on the idea of the “three Rs” of reduction, replacement, and 
refinement of animal research.4 Reduction aims to minimize the 
number of animals used to those needed for the scientific endeavor. 
Replacement works to substitute the use of live animals with 
alternative models, such as computer-based simulation or in vitro 
studies. Refinement involves lessening harms to animals used in 
research through changes to research procedures, improved 
management of pain and distress, and improved housing and 
caretaking. Within the broader replacement framework, partial or 
relative replacement envisions substituting cognitively higher-
developed animals with cognitively less-developed animals.5 This is 
based on the idea that more cognitively developed species have an 
increased sentience and a greater ability to suffer.6 
A core professional ethics problem regarding the greater use of 
gene-edited large-animal models is the tension between reduction and 
relative replacement. According to relative replacement, there would 
typically be an incentive to replace larger animals with smaller species 
if they are also less cognitively developed.7 However, since far fewer 
 
 2. See Aaron C. Ericsson, Marcus J. Crim & Craig L. Franklin, A Brief History of 
Animal Modeling, 110 MO. MED. 201, 203–04 (2013). The advances of gene editing are 
especially remarkable given that the study of genetics is itself a relatively new academic 
specialty, as William Bateson coined the term “genetics” only in 1906. KAREN RADER, 
MAKING MICE: STANDARDIZING ANIMALS FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, 1900–1955, at 
27–28 (2004). 
 3. Alexandra Wendler & Martin Wehling, The Translatability of Animal Models for 
Clinical Development: Biomarkers and Disease Models, 10 CURRENT OPINION 
PHARMACOLOGY 601, 605 (2010). 
 4. See generally W. M. S. RUSSELL & R. L. BURCH, THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMANE 
EXPERIMENTAL TECHNIQUE 64 (1959) (discussing “the ways in which inhumanity can be 
.	.	. diminished or removed .	.	. under the three broad headings of Replacement, Reduction, 
and Refinement” (emphasis omitted)).  
 5. Nicole Fenwick, Gilly Griffin & Clément Gauthier, The Welfare of Animals Used 
in Science: How the “Three Rs” Ethic Guides Improvements, 50 CANADIAN VETERINARY 
J. 523, 523 (2009). 
 6. See id. 
 7. Id. 
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large animals would be used in gene-edited disease-model studies 
than, for example, the number of mice that would be used in these 
studies, reduction argues in favor of using gene-edited large-animal 
models.8 How should this tension between reduction and relative 
replacement be resolved? To put the point in sharp relief: If possible, 
should we trade a study using one thousand rodents for a potentially 
more translatable study using ten NHPs, dogs, or pigs? 
The three Rs have been crucial to structuring regulatory 
guidance for animal research, especially in the European Union but 
also in the United States.9 In this Article, we investigate the 
comparative regulatory implications in the United States and 
European Union of genetically modifying large animals to better 
model human diseases and the increased research uses of large 
animals that might follow. Outside of specific restrictions regarding 
the use of some species (particularly great apes and, to a much lesser 
extent, other NHPs), there is little within the U.S. or E.U. regulatory 
and professional ethics frameworks that offers guidance in terms of 
the ethical permissibility of the trade-offs between using large 
numbers of rodents and small numbers of large-animal models that 
we suggest may be on the horizon. While there is no substantive 
regulatory guidance on this issue, there is reason to believe that the 
general ethos of animal research ethics would favor the trend. At the 
same time, other considerations, such as the cost of research 
conducted with large animals and difficulties in procuring species of 
NHP, may dampen this trend somewhat.10 Since regulatory guidance 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Council Directive 2010/63, pmbl. ¶	11, 2010 O.J. (L 276) 33, 34 [hereinafter 
Council Directive 2010/63]; Larry Carbone, Pain in Laboratory Animals: The Ethical and 
Regulatory Imperatives, 6 PLOS ONE, no. e21578, Sept. 7, 2011, at 1, 1–2. 
 10. Emily W. Lankau et al., Use of Nonhuman Primates in Research in North 
America, 53 J. AM. ASS’N FOR LABORATORY ANIMAL SCI. 278, 280–81 (2014). It is too 
early to tell how prevalent the trend toward greater use of large-animal models will 
become. According to data available through the U.S. Department of Agriculture on 
numbers of animals used in research, a comparison between 2012 (when CRISPR-Cas9 
was developed specifically as a gene-editing tool) and 2017 (the most recent year for which 
data is available) shows the numbers of dogs used rose by less than 1%, sheep use rose by 
approximately 6%, and pig use dropped by approximately 11%. However, NHP use rose 
by approximately 15%. Compare ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., USDA, 
ANNUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2014) [hereinafter ANNUAL 
REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2012], www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/
downloads/reports/Animals%20Used%20In%20Research%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BH5F-5X8L], with ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., USDA, ANNUAL 
REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2018) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 
ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2017], https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/
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on an increased use of genetically modified large mammals within 
biomedicine is sparse, we do briefly note broader social and ethical 
conundrums that the trend raises. 
The discussion proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the 
scientific landscape in which large-animal models play an increasingly 
important role in research. Part II focuses on the regulatory and 
professional ethical frameworks guiding animal research in the 
United States and in the European Union, particularly emphasizing 
differences between the two jurisdictions that suggest inconsistencies 
in their moral approach to animal research. Part III introduces the 
issue of moral standing for the animals subject to genetic and other 
biomedical studies and illustrates how the U.S. and E.U. regulatory 
frameworks approach the issue. Part IV then analyzes the 
implications of these policy differences for the use of gene-edited 
large-animal models. Finally, Part V introduces moral considerations 
that have not yet been accommodated in the regulatory and 
professional ethical frameworks governing gene-edited animal 
research to offer some introductory thoughts on how existing 
frameworks could be improved. 
I.  GENE EDITING AND EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE LARGE-ANIMAL 
MODELS 
The scientific basis for a potential turn to a greater use of gene-
edited large-animal models consists of two factors. First, there is 
broad agreement that there is a need to improve current animal 
models to increase efficiency and translatability of animal research.11 
While rodents have long served as models for human diseases, 
knowledge gained through their use in biomedical research may be 
less translatable to humans than knowledge gained through the use of 
larger mammals that are otherwise generally more similar to 
humans.12 Second, CRISPR gene editing represents a new tool with 
unprecedented capacity to efficiently and effectively manipulate the 
 
downloads/reports/Annual-Report-Animal-Usage-by-FY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9CC-
D3C9]. Importantly, it is impossible to tell what portion of that use is related to genome 
editing. Compare ANNUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2012, supra, with 
ANNUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR 2017, supra. 
 11. See Hideyuki Okano & Noriyuki Kishi, Investigation of Brain Science and 
Neurological/Psychiatric Disorders Using Genetically Modified Non-Human Primates, 50 
CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 1, 1 (2018). 
 12. Id. 
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genomes of animal models, including large mammals.13 Because larger 
animals have significant potential to better model human diseases 
than smaller animals and are typically used in much fewer numbers 
than smaller animals, they offer the potential for a dramatic change in 
the translatability and efficiency of animal research.14 
Rodents are easy to breed, relatively short-lived, efficient to 
house and manage, and there are well-established gene-manipulation 
techniques for these animals.15 The expanded use of mice in the early 
decades of genetics also largely managed to escape social critique in 
part because the initial uses were primarily for genetic breeding 
purposes and also because the antivivisectionist movement of the 
time was focused on scientists’ use of dogs and cats.16 These factors all 
contribute to mice being a model of choice for many biomedical 
researchers today. 
Limitations in the model are nevertheless becoming more widely 
recognized and discussed. For example, while rodents have 
contributed greatly to our understanding of human biology and 
development, there are also significant differences between mice and 
humans that limit their usefulness as models of human diseases.17 
These differences include physical size, life span, diet, differences in 
brain and other organ structure and function, and genomic 
differences. Each of these factors may limit the translational potential 
of rodent studies to human clinical application.18 Mouse studies of 
diseases such as cystic fibrosis, Lesch-Nylan syndrome, and 
Huntington’s disease illustrate the shortcomings of the mouse model, 
as animals carrying genetic mutations relevant to the human disease 
phenotype nevertheless do not show all the same symptoms that a 
 
 13. Ellen Shrock & Marc Güell, CRISPR in Animals and Animal Models, in 152 
PROGRESS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY AND TRANSLATIONAL SCIENCE 95, 95–114 (Raúl 
Torres-Ruiz & Sandra Rodriguez-Perales eds., 2017) (discussing large mammal 
applications and noting CRISPR has “revolutionized the field of genome editing”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Herbert C. Morse III, Building a Better Mouse: One Hundred Years of 
Genetics and Biology, in 1 THE MOUSE IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: HISTORY, WILD 
MICE, AND GENETICS 1, 7–8 (James G. Fox et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
 16. RADER, supra note 2, at 35–37. 
 17. Robert L. Perlman, Mouse Models of Human Disease: An Evolutionary 
Perspective, EVOLUTION, MED. & PUB. HEALTH, April 12, 2016, at 170, 170. 
 18. Id. at 171–74; see also Okano & Kishi, supra note 11, at 1; H. Bart van der Worp et 
al., Can Animal Models of Disease Reliably Inform Human Studies?, 7 PLOS MED., no. 
e1000245, Mar. 30, 2010, at 1, 5–6. 
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human will show.19 Thus, what we learn with regard to treating the 
symptoms in the animal model may be of limited help for the human 
clinic. 
Critically, a significant percentage of potential new drugs are 
removed from development because of a lack of efficacy and/or safety 
when tested in humans.20 High attrition rates have been reported for 
multiple fields, including neurological diseases, oncology, and 
infectious diseases.21 While there are diverse explanations for these 
high rates of drug attrition, including poor study design, inadequate 
animal models of the human diseases are frequently cited.22 
The low rates of translatability explain why there is an increasing 
interest in using larger-animal models that may better mimic the 
course and potential cures of human diseases.23 While multiple large-
animal models have been used in the study of diseases with genomic 
factors, dogs, pigs, and NHPs have all been singled out as particularly 
promising for certain types of diseases.24 Generally speaking, the life 
span of larger mammals is more similar to humans, a factor that is 
important for the onset and development of many human disease 
 
 19. C. Bruce A. Whitelaw et al., Engineering Large Animal Models of Human 
Disease, 238 J. PATHOLOGY 247, 247 (2015). 
 20. Paul McGonigle & Bruge Ruggeri, Animal Models of Human Disease: Challenges 
in Enabling Translation, 87 BIOCHEMICAL PHARMACOLOGY 162, 163 (2014); van der 
Worp et al., supra note 18, at 1. 
 21. Jarrod Bailey, Michelle Thew & Michael Balls, An Analysis of the Use of Animal 
Models in Predicting Human Toxicology and Drug Safety, 42 ALTERNATIVES TO 
LABORATORY ANIMALS 181, 196 (2014); Ismail Kola & John Landis, Can the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce Attrition Rates?, 3 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 
711, 712–14 (2004); Ian Walker & Herbie Newell, Do Molecularly Targeted Agents in 
Oncology Have Reduced Attrition Rates?, 8 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 15, 16 
(2009). 
 22. See Melanie L. Graham & Mark J. Prescott, The Multifactorial Role of the 3Rs in 
Shifting the Harm-Benefit Analysis in Animal Models of Disease, 759 EUR. J. 
PHARMACOLOGY 19, 21, 23–24 (2015); see also Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the 
Decline in Pharmaceutical R&D Efficiency, 11 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 
194–95 (2012).  
 23. See Ericsson et al., supra note 2, at 203. 
 24. Margaret Casal & Mark Haskins, Large Animal Models and Gene Therapy, 14 
EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 266, 267 (2006); Whitelaw et al., supra note 19, at 247. See 
generally Sandrine Camus et al., Why Bother Using Non-Human Primate Models of 
Cognitive Disorders in Translational Research?, 124 NEUROBIOLOGY LEARNING & 
MEMORY 123 (2015) (explaining that NHPs particularly “remain critical for the 
accumulation of biomedical knowledge given that they are the closest resemblance to 
humans in aspects of anatomy, physiology, immunology, social behaviours, and cognitive 
function”). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2019) 
1248 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
phenotypes.25 For specific large-animal models, there are also other 
close similarities to humans, including organ physiology, brain 
structures, and behavioral and social capacities.26 Pigs are used in 
diabetes research, for example, because of certain physiological 
similarities to humans. Current bioengineering of pigs at a molecular 
level to more closely mimic human diabetes is considered highly 
promising for biomedicine.27 NHPs, on the other hand, may better 
mimic human neurodegenerative diseases due to similarities in brain 
structure.28 The primate prefrontal cortex is a recently evolved brain 
structure responsible for higher cognitive processes and is vulnerable 
with regard to some psychiatric diseases.29 Because rodent brains do 
not share the unique structure and function of the primate prefrontal 
cortex, it is impossible to fully model the complexity of the human 
brain in rodents.30 Thus, even genetically modified rodents may not 
adequately model some human neurodegenerative diseases. For 
example, while a Parkin gene mutation in humans is a common cause 
of early-onset familial Parkinson’s disease, a similar mutation of the 
Parkin gene in mice leads to incomplete mimicking of the Parkinson’s 
disease symptoms in these patients.31 Rodent models of other 
neurodegenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer’s and Huntington’s 
diseases, show similar limitations by lacking the typical 
neurodegeneration that is so significant in human patients.32 
In sum, the turn to genome-edited large-animal models of 
disease is driven in part by a promise of better translation to 
treatment of certain human diseases and conditions. What makes the 
 
 25. See Ilaria Bellantuono & Paul K. Potter, Modelling Ageing and Age-Related 
Disease, 20 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 27, 27, 31 (2016) (noting the “complex problem” 
of modeling diseases in smaller animals and the insufficiency of data without models of 
longer life span).  
 26. So Gun Hong et al., The Role of Nonhuman Primate Animal Models in the 
Clinical Development of Pluripotent Stem Cell Therapies, 24 MOLECULAR THERAPY 1165, 
1165 (2016). 
 27. Eckhard Wolf et al., Genetically Engineered Pig Models for Diabetes Research, 23 
TRANSGENIC RES. 27, 27 (2014). 
 28. Camus et al., supra note 24, at 124–25; Casal & Haskins, supra note 24, at 267; 
Whitelaw et al., supra note 19, at 247. 
 29. Okano & Kishi, supra note 11, at 1. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Jean-Michel Itier et al., Parkin Gene Inactivation Alters Behaviour and 
Dopamine Neurotransmission in the Mouse, 12 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 2277, 2285–
86 (2003).  
 32. Zhuchi Tu et al., CRISPR/Cas9: A Powerful Genetic Engineering Tool for 
Establishing Large Animal Models of Neurodegenerative Diseases, 10 MOLECULAR 
NEURODEGENERATION, no. 35, Aug. 4, 2015, at 1, 1–2. 
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turn possible, however, are the significant improvements in genome-
editing technologies. Earlier methods of producing genetically 
modified large-animal models of human diseases offered generally 
low rates of success and were highly inefficient.33 However, the newer 
gene editors using site-specific nucleases are able to better target loci 
within the genome to both “knock-in” and “knockout” specific 
genes.34 In particular, CRISPR paired with specific nucleases35 
potentially offers an effective and efficient way of cheaply modifying 
DNA at specific locations and has led to the development of multiple 
new animal models with more extensive genomic modifications than 
earlier methods.36 Because these newer gene editors are efficient in 
introducing accurate mutations in both alleles of the same gene and 
can be used directly in reproductive cells, they make possible the 
development of larger animal models of specific human diseases that 
were previously impossible, including in sheep, pigs, dogs, and 
NHPs.37 In sum, CRISPR gene editing is seen as a potent strategy to 
broaden “the repertoire of useful animal disease models significantly 
beyond that currently available.”38 
The scientific promise of large-animal models, along with the 
technological capacity to generate these models, helps to explain why 
a turn to their increased use may be on the horizon. Yet animals used 
in biomedical research may undergo painful and distressing 
interventions, are commonly euthanized at the conclusion of a study 
(or at a humane endpoint to a study), and live their lives confined to a 
research facility.39 Insofar as the use of animals in biomedical research 
 
 33. James West & William Warren Gill, Genome Editing in Large Animals, 41 J. 
EQUINE VETERINARY SCI. 1, 2 (2016). 
 34. Whitelaw et al., supra note 19, at 248. 
 35. The CRISPR/Cas9 system utilizes nuclease (protein that cuts DNA) and a guiding 
sequence (genetic base pairs that direct the nuclease to the gene locus of choice) that can 
efficiently cut DNA at targeted sites to induce mutations or to introduce specific DNA 
sequences into said target locus. See Mazhar Adli, The CRISPR Tool Kit for Genome 
Editing and Beyond, 9 NATURE COMM., no. 1911, May 15, 2018, at 1, 2–3 (outlining the 
development of gene-editing science).  
 36. Shrock & Güell, supra note 13, at 95–114. 
 37. Jon Cohen, In Dogs, CRISPR Fixes a Muscular Dystrophy, 361 SCIENCE 835, 835 
(2018); Xiangyu Guo & Xiao-Jiang Li, Targeted Genome Editing in Primate Embryos, 25 
CELL RES. 767, 767–68 (2015); Carolin Perleberg, Alexandre Kind & Angelika Schnieke, 
Genetically Engineered Pigs as Models for Human Disease, 11 DISEASE MODELS & 
MECHANISMS, no. 030783, Jan. 22, 2018, at 1, 1; Whitelaw et al., supra note 19, at 247; 
Diarra K. Williams et al., Genetic Engineering a Large Animal Model of Human 
Hypophosphatasia in Sheep, 8 SCI. REP., no. 16945, Nov. 16, 2018, at 1, 1–2.  
 38. Whitelaw et al., supra note 19, at 253. 
 39. See Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶¶	14–15, at 34. 
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is justifiable, it is arguable that, at a minimum, a professional ethical 
responsibility exists to maximize the potential benefits from such use. 
From a responsible conduct-of-research point of view, then, the 
increase in efficiency and translatability that large-animal models 
seem to offer suggests a strong argument in favor of using these 
models. At the same time, using these animals is typically seen as 
morally problematic because of their relatively high social, 
intellectual, and emotional capacities—capacities that more closely 
mirror our own. In what follows, this Article analyzes the implications 
of a trend toward using more gene-edited large-animal models from a 
regulatory and professional ethics framework. 
II.  THE U.S. AND E.U. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR ANIMAL 
RESEARCH 
This Article applies a comparative analysis to the animal 
research regulatory frameworks of the United States and European 
Union. These two regulatory structures are among the most stringent 
and influential in the world with regard to research oversight and 
accordingly present an opportunity to examine the extent to which 
helpful guidance is available on the CRISPR-driven turn to large-
animal uses. As we discuss, the E.U. framework offers somewhat 
stronger language for animal protection and valuation and contains 
elements not found in the U.S. legislation, such as a required harm-
benefit analysis and an upper limit on allowable pain and distress.40 
Nevertheless, as we analyze these and other elements of each 
framework, we reveal that neither the E.U. nor the U.S. framework 
offers particular guidance on the use of larger versus smaller gene-
edited animal models. Accordingly, the dilemma we raise in this 
Article regarding the tension between reduction and relative 
replacement remains unaddressed. In particular, neither the United 
States nor the European Union would prohibit—and both might be 
viewed as conducive to—the turn to greater use of gene-edited larger 
animals for biomedical research. 
A. E.U. Regulation 
In the European Union, research using nonhuman animals is 
guided by Directive 2010/63 on the Protection of Animals Used for 
Scientific Purposes (“Directive 2010/63”).41 Directive 2010/63 
 
 40. Id. pmbl. ¶	23, art. 38, at 35, 46–47. 
 41. Id. pmbl. ¶	1, at 33. 
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harmonizes animal research legislation across E.U. member-states 
and was implemented in the form of national laws by each state in 
2013.42 It covers research uses of vertebrate animals and cephalopods, 
as well as fetal forms of mammals in the last third of their 
development.43 Animal research proceeds through approval from 
authorities appointed in each member-state.44 Referred to as 
“competent authorities,” these officials make decisions about whether 
to authorize research projects based on a harm-benefit analysis and 
under advisement of an ethical review committee, among other 
criteria.45 Also, a national committee of each E.U. member-state 
advises both the competent authority and the local animal-welfare 
groups and serves as a clearinghouse for information on best practices 
for “acquisition, breeding, accommodation, [and the] care and use of 
animals in procedures.”46 
B. U.S. Regulation 
In the United States, the regulatory structure guiding animal 
research is somewhat more complex because there is both a federal 
law, the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”),47 as well as the Public Health 
Service (“PHS”) policy, revised in 2015,48 that covers federally funded 
research as mandated by the Health Research Extension Act of 
1985.49 The AWA is administered by the United States Department 
of Agriculture (“USDA”), specifically the Animal Care unit within 
the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”), 
and covers a wide range of issues in the transportation, sale, and 
handling of animals generally.50 The AWA includes standards for 
humane care and use for animals in a wide variety of contexts far 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. pmbl. ¶¶	8–9, at 34. 
 44. Id. pmbl. ¶	48, at 37. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. art. 49, at 49. 
 47. 7 U.S.C. §§	2131–2159 (2012). 
 48. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC 
HEALTH SERVICE POLICY ON HUMANE CARE AND USE OF LABORATORY ANIMALS 7 
(2015) [hereinafter PHS POLICY], https://olaw.nih.gov/sites/default/files/
PHSPolicyLabAnimals.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G8D-BUUE].  
 49. See 42 U.S.C. §	289(d) (2012). 
 50. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., USDA, ANIMAL WELFARE ACT 
AND ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS 1 (2017), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_
welfare/downloads/AC_BlueBook_AWA_FINAL_2017_508comp.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3JQD-DD2T]. 
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beyond animal research.51 By its terms, the AWA extends protections 
to research animals, including warm-blooded vertebrate animals, 
except birds, mice, and rats bred for research.52 The PHS policy is 
administered by the National Institutes of Health’s Office of 
Laboratory Animal Welfare (“OLAW”).53 It covers all research uses, 
experimentation, research training, and biological testing of live 
vertebrate animals sponsored (or conducted) by PHS agencies.54 
Unlike the E.U. legislation, it does not cover any fetal forms of 
animals nor does it cover any invertebrates.55 
The AWA and PHS policies are similar in a number of ways, 
perhaps most significantly by requiring oversight of research by 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (“IACUCs”)—
though they impose somewhat different membership requirements—
and through the requirement for adequate veterinary care.56 IACUCs 
review the research facility’s programs, inspect animal facilities and 
laboratories, and approve individual research protocols among other 
duties.57 The PHS policy also requires conformity of research 
practices with the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals 
(“the Guide”)58 and with the U.S. Government Principles for the 
Utilization and Care of Vertebrate Animals Used in Testing, 
Research, and Training (the “U.S. Government Principles”).59 
An important difference between the AWA and PHS regulations 
pertains to facility inspection requirements. The USDA conducts 
unannounced on-site inspections of facilities doing research with 
covered species at least yearly, while the PHS policy relies on 
inspections of the facilities (at least every six months) by IACUCs 
and a written assurance submitted by the institution regarding their 
 
 51. 7 U.S.C. §	2144 (2012). 
 52. Id. §	2132(g). 
 53. PHS POLICY, supra note 48, at 9. 
 54. Id. at 7. 
 55. Id. at 8. 
 56. 7 U.S.C. §	2143(a) (2012). 
 57. 9 C.F.R. §	2.31 (2018). 
 58. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., GUIDE FOR 
THE CARE AND USE OF LABORATORY ANIMALS (8th ed. 2011) [hereinafter GUIDE FOR 
CARE AND USE], https://grants.nih.gov/grants/olaw/guide-for-the-care-and-use-of-laboratory-
animals.pdf [https://perma.cc/DSG2-GKHH] (addressing ethical research practices with 
animals in accordance with the three Rs).  
 59. U.S. Government Principles for Utilization and Care of Vertebrate Animals Used 
in Testing, Research and Training, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,864, 20,864 (May 20, 1985). 
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compliance with PHS policies.60 Another significant difference is 
which animals are covered. Because mice and rats bred for research 
are not covered by the AWA, their use is not reported to the USDA. 
Therefore, it remains unknown precisely how many of these animals 
are used for research in the United States. However, because 
estimates are that eighty-five to ninety-five percent of vertebrate 
animals used are mice or rats, it is significant that these animals are 
not covered by the AWA.61 In the United States, therefore, certain 
vertebrate animals used for privately funded research in a facility not 
voluntarily accredited might receive no oversight protections. 
C. Nongovernmental Regulation 
A third aspect of the oversight picture of animal research 
internationally is the option of voluntary accreditation and 
assessment by the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of 
Laboratory Animal Care International (“AAALAC International”), 
a private nonprofit organization founded in 1965 that promotes 
uniform high standards of animal care and use.62 AAALAC 
International accreditation requires an application process and an 
initial site visit.63 Maintaining accreditation involves yearly updates as 
well as site visits (with notice) every three years.64 AAALAC 
International assessments rely on both U.S. and E.U. guidelines, 
though the accreditation generally resembles the Guide in the United 
States by using a performance standard that looks to outcomes and 
professional judgment for its assessment of research programs.65 
 
 60. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND 
ANIMALS 33–34 (2004) [hereinafter SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND ANIMALS].  
 61. The U.S. National Association for Biomedical Research, a lobbying group that 
advocates for the use of animals in research, estimates ninety-five percent of vertebrates 
used are mice and rats. Mice and Rats, NAT’L ASS’N FOR BIOMEDICAL RES., 
https://www.nabr.org/biomedical-research/laboratory-animals/species-in-research/mice-and-
rats/ [https://perma.cc/B7UN-J4MF]. The Humane Society of the United States, which 
advocates for an eventual end to the harmful use of animals in research, estimates that 
mice and rats comprise eighty-five to ninety percent of vertebrates used in research. 
Questions and Answers About Biomedical Research, HUMANE SOC’Y U.S., 
https://www.humanesociety.org/resources/questions-and-answers-about-biomedical-research 
[https://perma.cc/FJG3-YHLR]. 
 62. SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND ANIMALS, supra note 60, at 32. 
 63. Accreditation, AAALAC INT’L, https://www.aaalac.org/accreditation/steps.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/MJ48-Z9SY]. 
 64. Id. 
 65. GUIDE FOR CARE AND USE, supra note 58; Accreditation, supra note 63.  
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III.  ANIMAL MORAL STATUS IN U.S. AND E.U. REGULATORY 
GUIDANCE 
The U.S. and E.U. regulatory structures guiding animal research 
are similar in terms of rigor and overall aim—protection of animal 
welfare within the constraints introduced by the needs of science. 
However, these systems differ in ways that are significant, at least in 
principle, for considering the moral status of animals in a research 
setting.66 The difference between the U.S. and E.U. regulatory 
structures regarding animal moral status is not explicitly addressed in 
either set of regulatory guidance. Regulations in the United States 
demonstrate that some particularly harmful research, such as 
exposure to pathogens or radiation, is permissible in animals because 
“it would be unethical to deliberately expose healthy human 
volunteers.”67 Other than by this implied lower moral status in 
comparison to human subjects, however, the U.S. laws and policies 
generally avoid reference to the moral standing of animals used in 
research. What then are the grounds for stating that the two 
regulatory structures have different animal moral status implications? 
Here we briefly note four bases for this claim: first is the regulatory 
language describing the value of animals; second is the E.U. 
requirement for a harm-benefit analysis for protocol approval; third is 
the E.U. requirement that an upper limit be placed on pain and 
distress for research animals; and fourth is the particular protection 
the United States affords to certain species. 
A. Regulatory Language Describing the Value of Animals 
Regulators presumably take guidance on the moral status of 
research animals from institutional mandates that reflect their 
government’s values or priorities. In the United States, the Guide 
requires that “all who care for, use, or produce animals for research, 
testing, or teaching must assume responsibility for their well-being.”68 
While this sounds like a promotion of animal moral status, it is 
 
 66. By “moral status” this Article means consideration owed by ethical agents to “the 
needs, interests, or well-being” of animals by virtue of the kinds of creatures they are. See 
MARY ANNE WARREN, MORAL STATUS: OBLIGATIONS TO PERSONS AND OTHER 
LIVING THINGS 3 (1997). 
 67. 21 C.F.R. §	314.600 (2018). There is nevertheless a long history of exposing human 
subjects to very harmful pathogens, including smallpox and yellow fever. SUSAN E. 
LEDERER, SUBJECTED TO SCIENCE: HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN AMERICA BEFORE 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 4, 19–21 (1995). 
 68. GUIDE FOR CARE AND USE, supra note 58, at 1. 
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important to note that assuming responsibility for animal well-being is 
compatible with a view that does not grant animals direct moral 
status. That is because animals whose well-being is supported are 
generally better sources of reliable scientific data.69 Thus, the goal of 
assuming such responsibility may simply be promoting the goals of 
the science rather than the direct value of the animals themselves. By 
contrast, the E.U. framework directly recognizes that “[a]nimals have 
an intrinsic value which must be respected.”70 The European Union’s 
notion of intrinsic value cannot be mistaken for the animal’s 
instrumental value, thus going beyond the moral status implications 
of the U.S. guidance. 
B. The E.U.’s Harm-Benefit Analysis Requirement 
Specific features of the E.U. oversight that are not mirrored in 
the U.S. system further concretize a difference in the moral status 
each system grants to animals used in biomedical research. First, 
there is a specific requirement in the European Union for a harm-
benefit analysis of research protocols before they can be approved.71 
These harm-benefit analyses do not operate on a philosophical 
utilitarian model of giving equal consideration to like interests 
regardless of species.72 However, the requirement for such an analysis 
itself supports the idea that harms to animals must be balanced to 
some determinate degree against potential human (or other animal) 
benefit, and an ethical proposal must be able to legitimately claim 
that the benefits will outweigh the harms to a reasonable degree.73 In 
any given system of harm-benefit calculation, the extent to which 
animal harms are discounted relative to human benefit exposes an 
unequal weight given to their ethical consideration. Whether or how 
this can be justified is a matter for considerable philosophical 
debate.74 Nevertheless, the requirement to conduct a harm-benefit 
analysis itself is a signal of the European Union taking animal moral 
value seriously, whether discounted relative to human value or not. 
 
 69. See Carbone, supra note 9, at 1–5.  
 70. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶	12, at 34. 
 71. Id. art. 38(2)(d), at 47. 
 72. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 20–21 (Pimlico, 2d ed. 1995) (1990). 
 73. See Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, art. 38, at 46–47. 
 74. See Rebecca L. Walker & Nancy M. P. King, Biodefense Research and the U.S. 
Regulatory Structure: Whither Nonhuman Primate Moral Standing?, 21 KENNEDY INST. 
ETHICS J. 277, 277–310 (2011). 
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In the United States, the weighing of animal harm against 
potential human benefit is not similarly prioritized. The U.S. 
Government Principles contain the general admonition that 
“[p]rocedures involving animals should be designed and performed 
with due consideration of their relevance to human or animal health, 
the advancement of knowledge, or the good of society.”75 However, 
these vague appeals to scientific relevance are not carried through in 
any concrete requirement for a harm-benefit analysis within the 
IACUC protocol assessment.76 While the process of undergoing 
review for National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) grant funding does 
include rigorous assessment by both a peer group of scientists and an 
advisory council that includes public representation, that process also 
does not explicitly balance potential benefits against the harms to 
animals required to achieve those benefits. Thus, unlike in human-
subject ethics review,77 in the United States animal subject protocols 
are not necessarily assessed for their likely net value. 
C. The E.U.’s Upper Pain Threshold 
A third difference between the U.S. and E.U. systems is that the 
United States lacks an upper limit to admissible pain or distress of 
animals used in scientific research. In the United States, there are 
significant requirements that researchers “avoid or minimize 
discomfort” and distress to animals.78 In particular, the requirements 
apply to the use of analgesics when animals will experience pain and 
euthanizing animals when needed as a humane endpoint.79 However, 
these requirements are circumscribed by the needs of science. 
Accordingly, if a scientific justification can be given to withhold 
analgesics or to cause severe pain or distress, the science takes 
precedence. This could occur when pain itself is being studied so that 
animal suffering is mandatory to achieve the study objective. For 
example, a study of the potential efficacy of new pain drugs requires 
pain to be inflicted on animal subjects to test whether the drug 
alleviated that pain. The same reasoning also applies if offering pain 
 
 75. U.S. Government Principles for Utilization and Care of Vertebrate Animals Used 
in Testing, Research and Training, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,864, 20,864 (May 20, 1985). 
 76. See Larry Carbone, Justification for the Use of Animals, in THE IACUC 
HANDBOOK 211, 211–36 (Jerald Silverman, Mark A. Suckow & Sreekant Murthy eds., 3d 
ed. 2014). 
 77. See 48 C.F.R. §§	1352.235–70 to .235–73 (2018) (outlining the review process for 
research involving human subjects). 
 78. 9 C.F.R. §	2.31(d) (2018). 
 79. Id. §	2.31(d)(i), (iv)–(v); PHS POLICY, supra note 48, at 4. 
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relief would interfere with the data being collected and thus the 
validity of the study,80 such as when the use of analgesics is avoided in 
animal studies because analgesics alter the animal’s physiological 
response.81 The IACUC review, then, must either ensure that 
appropriate analgesics are employed when procedures cause more 
than minimal pain or otherwise approve a scientific justification for 
withholding such pain relief.82 An upper limit on permissible animal 
suffering83 offers an ethical limitation on what may be done to animals 
for the sake of human benefit and suggests, in principle, that animals 
have some determinate moral status. Alternatively, if permissible 
pain and suffering is conditioned by the needs of science, where the 
ethical value of the scientific intervention is not independently 
assessed, then arguably animals are deprived of a moral status in 
exchange for their rote scientific value. It is important to note that the 
European Union also allows requirements for analgesia to be 
overridden by scientific justification.84 The difference is in the upper 
limit of allowable pain established in the E.U. framework. 
D. The Three Rs in Practice 
As noted above, the internationally recognized ethical 
framework supporting and guiding animal research is the three Rs: 
reduction, refinement, and replacement. The contrasting approaches 
to the three Rs between the U.S. and E.U. systems raise somewhat 
more vague implications for animal moral standing. These “principles 
of humane experimental technique”85 are central to the European 
Union’s commitment to diminishing a reliance on animal research 
 
 80. Jerrold Tannenbaum, Ethics and Pain Research in Animals, 40 INST. FOR 
LABORATORY ANIMAL RES. J. 97, 97–110 (1999). 
 81. Carbone, supra note 9, at 6. 
 82. 9 C.F.R. §	2.31(d)(iv)(A) (2018); see also Alicia Z. Karas & Jerald Silverman, Pain 
and Distress, in THE IACUC HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at 317, 326–27. 
 83. The E.U. Directive 2010/63 remains silent regarding the specific threshold of 
permissible pain and suffering. However, the Directive lists in Annex VIII several 
procedures classified as “severe” (i.e., not reaching the upper limit and so still 
permissible), particularly “(a) toxicity testing where death is the end-point, .	.	. (b) testing 
of device where failure may cause severe pain, distress or death of the animal (e.g., cardiac 
assist devices); .	.	. [and] (m) forced swim or exercise tests with exhaustion as the end-
point.” Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, annex VIII, sec. III(3), at 79. There is thus 
a question about the practical significance of an “upper limit” to pain in terms of animal 
protection. Nevertheless, having such a limit established in law does not offer a conceptual 
framework that allows for the extension of direct moral standing to animals used in 
research.    
 84. Id. art. 14, at 42.  
 85. RUSSELL & BURCH, supra note 4, at 64.  
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overall.86 In the United States, the three Rs have been implicit in the 
regulatory guidance but only explicitly mentioned in the more recent 
versions of the Guide as a “practical strategy for decision making” 
regarding the use of animals.87 Moreover, there generally appears to 
be less commitment in the U.S. system to the idea that animal use in 
science is provisional. While E.U. Directive 2010/63 states that the use 
of live animals “continues to be necessary,”88 the U.S. Government 
Principles simply state that “[t]he development of knowledge 
necessary for the improvement of the health and well-being of 
humans as well as other animals requires in vivo experimentation with 
a wide variety of animal species.”89 Further, in the United States, the 
use of alternatives such as “mathematical models, computer 
simulation, and in vitro biological systems should be considered” but 
are not mandated.90 While the differences between the two 
jurisdictions’ emphasis on the three Rs are a matter of interpretation, 
it is significant that the European Union generally puts greater 
emphasis on the provisional nature of the use of animals in research. 
This relative focus on the three Rs in the European Union supports, 
at least in principle, the view that animals are ethically valuable and 
that their use is a moral problem that may be solved by phasing out 
that use over time.91 
E. U.S. Species-Specific Protections 
In addition to the differences between the U.S. and E.U. systems 
relative to the general moral status of research animals, the U.S. 
system has its own set of species-specific protections that are worth 
noting. As noted above, the AWA only covers certain species of 
warm-blooded vertebrate animals used in research. In current 
practice, mice in particular are widely subject to gene editing, and 
these animals are not covered by the AWA. Within the AWA there is 
specific mention of a requirement for “exercise of dogs” and “for a 
physical environment adequate to promote the psychological well-
 
 86. See Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶¶	10, 39, art. 1, at 34, 36, 38–
39. 
 87. GUIDE FOR CARE AND USE, supra note 58, at 3. 
 88. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶	10, at 34 (emphasis added). 
 89. U.S. Government Principles for Utilization and Care of Vertebrate Animals Used 
in Testing, Research and Training, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,864, 20,864 (May 20, 1985) (emphasis 
added). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶	11, at 34. 
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being of primates.”92 Thus, both dogs and primates receive special 
protections under the AWA. Other than these special protections, the 
AWA and attending regulations generally require keeping individual 
records for dogs and cats, as well as for primates acquired and used in 
research,93 and dictate the need for species-appropriate living 
conditions that contribute to the animals’ “health and comfort.”94 
Both the AWA and PHS Policy regulations and guidance generally 
require that there be a scientific justification for the appropriateness 
of the species used in a protocol.95 Finally, best practices for 
laboratory animal euthanasia depend on the particular species.96 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.-E.U. REGULATORY SYSTEM 
DIFFERENCES FOR THE INCREASED USE OF GENE-EDITED LARGE-
ANIMAL MODELS 
While the United States and European Union are similar in 
terms of their rigorous and extensive oversight of animal research 
practices—and are among the most thorough oversight systems in the 
world—this Article has noted both practical and conceptual 
differences in how the systems are structured. How do these 
differences impact the ethics and policy implications of a greater use 
of gene-edited large-animal models? It may appear initially that the 
E.U. system is more likely to place hurdles in the way of such use due 
to its greater emphasis on animal moral status and the three Rs. 
However, as we shall argue, that is not necessarily the case. 
In this part, we first spell out in further detail why we believe the 
three Rs cannot offer conclusive guidance regarding an increased use 
of gene-edited large-animal models. We then proceed by going step-
by-step through the E.U. project evaluation process to consider where 
it might offer guidance on the issue of gene modification of large-
animal models. Next, we consider how the upper limit on pain in the 
E.U. regulations engages the issue. Finally, we consider what species-
specific protections in the United States and in the European Union 
 
 92. 7 U.S.C. §	2143(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
 93. See Angela M. Mexas & Diane J. Gaertner, Amending IACUC Protocols, in THE 
IACUC HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at 177, 192. 
 94. 9 C.F.R. §	2.31(d)(iv)(A) (2018). 
 95. See Mexas & Gaertner, supra note 93, at 181. 
 96. See AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, AVMA GUIDELINES FOR THE EUTHANASIA 
OF ANIMALS: 2013 EDITION 48–51 (2013), https://www.avma.org/KB/Policies/Documents/
euthanasia.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8H8-4G7G]. 
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may offer. Through this process, we show why neither system inhibits 
a move to greater use of gene-edited large-animal models.  
The three Rs, as the ethical framework underlying the 
responsible conduct of animal research, contain internal conflict. The 
conflict that is crucial for this Article, as previously discussed, is 
primarily between reduction and relative replacement. However, 
there are additional tensions within the three Rs, as well as conflicting 
interpretations of the individual Rs. Reduction, for example, is 
understood by animal protectionists as reduction of the total number 
of animals used in research.97 However, those promoting animal 
research understand the mandate as an increase in efficiency by using 
the fewest animals needed for individual protocols and/or increasing 
information gained from each animal.98 This second interpretation 
also raises the potential of reusing animals to further the aim of 
reduction.99 Such reuse, however, may be in conflict with refinement, 
which aims to lessen the harm to each individual animal.100 These 
conflicts in balancing and understanding the three Rs are significant 
because, ultimately, the tension between reduction and relative 
replacement in using large numbers of small animals versus small 
numbers of large animals is a tension that the professional ethical 
framework of animal research is incapable or unwilling to resolve. 
This ethical tension is thus reflected in the lack of guidance within the 
regulatory structures. 
Animal use in the European Union is, in coordination with the 
three Rs, regulated by a prospective project evaluation. Does a 
project evaluation (which, among other items, entails a mandatory 
harm-benefit analysis) give guidance on how to resolve this tension 
between reduction and relative replacement that is apparent in an 
increased use of genetically modified large animals? The European 
Union’s initial project evaluation procedure requires affirming that a 
project is justified from a scientific or educational point of view or 
required by law and that the project’s purpose justifies the use of 
animals.101 Moreover, the purpose of the experiment has to fall within 
 
 97. See I. Anna S. Olsson et al., The 3Rs Principle – Mind the Ethical Gap!, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH WORLD CONGRESS ON ALTERNATIVES AND ANIMAL USE IN 
THE LIFE SCIENCES, MONTREAL 2011, at 333, 333–34 (2012).  
 98. Id. 
 99. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, art. 16, at 42. 
 100. M.J. de Boo et al., The Interplay Between Replacement, Reduction and Refinement: 
Considerations Where the Three Rs Interact, 14 ANIMAL WELFARE 327, 328 (2005). 
 101. Project evaluation is mainly regulated according to Article 38 in the E.U. 
Directive 2010/63. See Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, art. 38, at 46–47. 
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the listed legal purposes for animal use, such as basic or translational 
research, education, or regulatory tests, among others.102 This step is 
primarily a scientific evaluation of the relevance of the research goal 
and whether the research design is appropriate to acquire the 
knowledge sought. 
Next, the project must demonstrate compliance with the three 
Rs. According to the European Union, the species with the lowest 
capacity to suffer should be used, but emphasis remains on 
guaranteeing the optimal potential for translation of the results into 
the target species—most often humans.103 If the knowledge gained 
from rodent studies can sufficiently be translated to the human 
condition, there would seem to be no justification to use larger 
animals in their stead. However, the low translatability of research 
findings has partially been attributed to the limitations of rodents as 
models for human diseases.104 For this reason, the species with the 
lowest capacity to suffer that also brings about the most satisfactory 
results might not be rodents but larger animals such as dogs, pigs, or 
NHPs. Based on this logic, if the only satisfactory results can be 
obtained from large-animal models, and if any animals are used, then 
only these models should be used. 
The next requirement in project evaluation is a severity 
assessment of the procedures involved and a harm-benefit analysis to 
weigh the interests of animals.105 A harm-benefit analysis relies on a 
modified utilitarian framework (i.e., one that discounts to some 
extent animal welfare in relation to human welfare), according to 
which even significant harms to animals are justifiable as long as the 
expected benefit is large enough.106 The specific language of the E.U. 
Directive 2010/63 calls for “taking into account ethical 
considerations”107 in balancing harms and benefits; however, what 
exactly “ethical consideration” means in this context remains 
 
 102. Id. art. 5, at 40. 
 103. See id. pmbl. ¶	13, at 34; id. art. 13, at 42 (expressing preference for procedures 
which “(a) use the minimum number of animals; (b) involve animals with the lowest 
capacity to experience pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm; (c) cause the least pain, 
suffering, distress or lasting harm; and are most likely to provide satisfactory results”). 
 104. van der Worp et al., supra note 18, at 5 (“[T]he translation of [rodent study] 
results to the clinic may fail because of disparities between the model and the clinical trials 
testing the treatment strategy.”). 
 105. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, art. 38(2)(d), at 47. 
 106. Id. annex VIII, sec. III(3), at 79. 
 107. Id. art. 38(2)(d), at 47. 
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elusive.108 Nevertheless, there are some indications regarding ethical 
considerations in the E.U.’s regulatory guidance. First, as discussed 
above, it is linked to the notion that all sentient animals have intrinsic 
value that must be respected and thus their use should be restricted to 
areas that may ultimately benefit humans, animals, or the 
environment.109 Second, the use of animals in research is only morally 
justified if the potential gain is sufficiently important.110 Yet the 
concept of ethical guidance in the E.U. Directive 2010/63 gives no 
specification at all on how to weigh the use of one species over 
another within a harm-benefit analysis. Thus, we must extrapolate. 
The potential for the generation of better (i.e., more 
translatable) large-animal models represents a potentially significant 
gain on the benefit side within the harm-benefit analysis as we have 
already addressed. However, since large-animal models are typically 
also more cognitively developed, their complex needs and interests 
call for a focus on refinement to induce as little suffering as possible 
through accommodating their special housing needs, providing 
adequate stimuli, and facilitating appropriate social interaction.111 
Further, hindrances to the specific social, psychological, and 
accommodation needs of these animals should be taken into 
consideration as harms of research in addition to those of the 
experimental intervention.112 Overall, the potential for increased 
suffering of large animals used in research must be outweighed by 
both the potential increase in benefit to humans, animals, or the 
environment, as well as the reduced numbers of animals used. In 
short, using a harm-benefit analysis, it is possible that genetically 
modifying large-animal models will increase individual animal 
 
 108. See Herwig Grimm, Ethics Within Legal Limits: Harm-Benefit Analysis According 
to the Directive 2010/63/EU, in KNOW YOUR FOOD: FOOD ETHICS AND INNOVATION 42, 
42–46 (Diana Elena Dumitras, Ionel Mugurel Jitea & Stef Aerts eds., 2015).  
 109. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶	12, at 34. 
 110. Id. pmbl. ¶	39, at 36. 
 111. See Anna Catarina Vieira de Castro & I. Anna S. Olsson, Does the Goal Justify 
the Methods? Harm and Benefit in Neuroscience Research Using Animals, in CURRENT 
TOPICS IN BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCES 47, 57–63 (Grace Lee, Judy Illes & Frauke Ohl 
eds., 2015). 
 112. The use of cognitively higher-developed animals requires appropriate measures to 
be taken to ensure species-appropriate housing and behavior. See id. at 60–62. In 
particular, the European Union requires: “(a) all animals are provided with 
accommodation, an environment, food, water and care which are appropriate to their 
health and well-being; [and] (b) any restrictions on the extent to which an animal can 
satisfy its physiological and ethological needs are kept to a minimum.” Council Directive 
2010/63, supra note 9, art. 33, at 45–46. 
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suffering; however, under the assumption that fewer animals are used 
and that more effective animal research would result, absolute 
suffering could still be reduced. Based on the logic of the harm-
benefit analysis, then, the fact that cognitively higher-developed 
animals may have a larger capacity to suffer than rodents does not 
disqualify them from use in animal research as long as the harm 
inflicted on them is outweighed by the benefit.113 
Another article of the E.U. Directive 2010/63 that warrants 
discussion regarding the use of gene-edited large-animal models is the 
establishment of an upper limit on pain and distress in biomedical 
research. Preamble 23 of the E.U. Directive 2010/63 states as follows: 
From an ethical standpoint, there should be an upper limit of 
pain, suffering and distress above which animals should not be 
subjected in scientific procedures. To that end, the performance 
of procedures that result in severe pain, suffering or distress, 
which is likely to be long-lasting and cannot be ameliorated, 
should be prohibited.114 
The concept of an upper limit on acceptable pain is interesting with 
regard to the belief that cognitively higher-developed animals have an 
increased ability to suffer. Depending on where that upper limit is, it 
is conceivable that higher-developed animals are more prone to reach 
that threshold compared to rodents. However, dogs, pigs, and NHP 
are used in harmful biomedical research, implying that regulators do 
not consider their use to automatically reach that threshold. Yet there 
is a legitimate concern that some animal models with genetic 
disorders such as “Huntington’s disease, Muscular dystrophy, [and] 
chronic relapsing neuritis” are expected to experience severe and 
persistent suffering.115 With regard to genetically modified large-
animal models for specific devastating human diseases, then, it would 
 
 113. It is interesting to note, despite this Article’s analysis, that a recent AALAS-
FELASA working group publication on harm-benefit analysis considered the use of 
eighty-seven pigs for a study to be of much greater harm compared to a study that used 
nine hundred mice. See generally Kathy Laber et al., Recommendations for Addressing 
Harm–Benefit Analysis and Implementation in Ethical Evaluation – Report from the 
AALAS–FELASA Working Group on Harm–Benefit Analysis – Part 2, 50 LABORATORY 
ANIMALS (SUPP. 1) 21, 21–42 (2016). The implication from this assessment is that the 
trend toward use of larger animals may, in practice, only be encouraged if the benefit is 
significantly higher compared to the benefit of a study in smaller animals. There clearly is 
also a perceived higher ethical barrier to using large-animal models even though no 
specific guidance to this effect is available in the E.U. Directive 2010/63. 
 114. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶	23, at 35. 
 115. Id. annex VIII, sec. III(3)(h), at 79. 
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need to be decided on a case-by-case basis whether this upper pain 
threshold is reached.116 
Thus, the upper limit on pain in animal studies does not appear 
to rule out the use of gene-edited large-animal models, even 
potentially for quite devastating human diseases. It is telling from an 
animal moral status point of view that the U.S. regulatory structure 
requires neither a specific harm-benefit analysis nor suggests an upper 
limit on admissible pain and suffering. Yet as illustrated here, the 
project evaluation in the European Union seems to place few hurdles 
to the use of gene-edited large animals even with these safeguards in 
place. Thus, nothing in our analysis of either the E.U. or U.S. 
regulatory structures would inhibit moving to gene-edited large-
animal models as a favored option to tackle intransigent human 
diseases. 
Only the species-specific protections in each set of regulations 
remain as potential barriers. E.U. Directive 2010/63 requires that 
great apes should only be used in research under exceptional 
circumstances, such as preservation of the species and only for human 
interests under life-threatening circumstances.117 In the United States, 
protections for chimpanzees in particular have evolved as a matter of 
institutional decisionmaking on the part of the NIH, culminating in a 
2015 determination to no longer fund chimpanzee research.118 The 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service determined in that same year that 
chimpanzees are an endangered species.119 Thus, while chimpanzee 
research is not illegal in the United States, hurdles to performing such 
research are extremely high. 
 
 116. What actually constitutes the upper limit threshold is never made explicit in the 
E.U. Directive 2010/63. See, e.g., id. annex VIII, at 76–79 (listing “[s]everity categories” of 
pain but not an upper limit). Severe suffering is still considered within an acceptable 
range, and a few examples of “severe” suffering include “breeding animals with genetic 
disorders that are expected to experience severe and persistent impairment of general 
condition, for example, Huntington’s disease, Muscular dystrophy, chronic relapsing 
neuritis models.” Id. annex VIII, sec. III(3)(h), at 79. Other nongenetic examples include 
“inescapable electric shock (e.g. to produce learned helplessness)” or “complete isolation 
for prolonged periods of social species e.g. dogs and non-human primates.” Id. annex VIII, 
sec. III(3)(k), at 79. 
 117. Id. pmbl. ¶	18, at 35. 
 118. Francis S. Collins, NIH Will No Longer Support Biomedical Research on 
Chimpanzees, NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.nih.gov/about-
nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/nih-will-no-longer-support-biomedical-research-
chimpanzees [https://perma.cc/9328-P9JE]. 
 119. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Listing All Chimpanzees as 
Endangered Species, 80 Fed. Reg., 34,500, 34,500 (June 16, 2015) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 
17). 
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Regarding the use of other NHPs, E.U. Directive 2010/63 notes 
both the continuing “necessity” of their use and also notes that such 
use raises “specific ethical and practical problems in terms of meeting 
their behavioural, environmental, and social needs in a laboratory 
environment.”120 These problems, along with social concern about the 
use of NHPs, leads to restrictions on their use to basic research, 
species preservation, or in relation to life-threatening or debilitating 
human conditions.121 Importantly, E.U. Directive 2010/63 specifically 
states that there needs to be “scientific justification to the effect that 
the purpose of the procedure cannot be achieved by the use of species 
other than non-human primates.”122 Thus, there appears to be an 
effort to keep NHPs as a “last resort” model to address human 
disease and disability. However, given the good fit of NHPs as models 
for some human disease conditions, along with the fact that those 
diseases are frequently debilitating,123 there is good reason to think 
many of the uses of gene-edited NHPs may be approved under these 
restrictions. 
While the U.S. regulations also require species-specific 
justification for the use of animals in scientific research and also 
 
 120. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶	17, at 34. 
 121. The E.U. Directive 2010/63 preamble states in full: 
Having regard to the present state of scientific knowledge, the use of non-human 
primates in scientific procedures is still necessary in biomedical research. Due to 
their genetic proximity to human beings and to their highly developed social skills, 
the use of non-human primates in scientific procedures raises specific ethical and 
practical problems in terms of meeting their behavioural, environmental and social 
needs in a laboratory environment. Furthermore, the use of non-human primates 
is of the greatest concern to the public. Therefore the use of non-human primates 
should be permitted only in those biomedical areas essential for the benefit of 
human beings, for which no other alternative replacement methods are yet 
available. Their use should be permitted only for basic research, the preservation 
of the respective non-human primate species or when the work, including 
xenotransplantation, is carried out in relation to potentially life-threatening 
conditions in humans or in relation to cases having a substantial impact on a 
person’s day-to-day functioning, i.e. debilitating conditions. 
 Id. pmbl. ¶	17, at 34–35. 
 122. Id. art. 8, at 40. Although here it is important to note that the safeguard clause 
also allows the use of NHPs by an E.U. member “where the use is not undertaken with a 
view to the avoidance, prevention, diagnosis or treatment of debilitating or potentially life-
threatening clinical conditions, [the E.U. member] may adopt a provisional measure 
allowing such use, provided the purpose cannot be achieved by the use of species other 
than non-human primates.” Id. art. 55, at 50. 
 123. Such debilitating diseases that could be modeled by NHP may include, for 
example, Huntington’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, and many others. 
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embrace the idea that the species with the least capacity to suffer 
ought to be used,124 these regulations neither require a special 
justification for the use of NHPs nor restrict their use to the particular 
purposes outlined by E.U. Directive 2010/63. In the United States, by 
contrast, the most apparent oversight difference between the use of 
dogs, pigs, primates, other large animals, and rodents is in the lack of 
coverage of rodents by the AWA.125 Practically, this means a lack of 
unannounced site inspections by USDA officers, a lack of reporting 
requirements regarding pain categories and subject numbers for 
rodents, and the absence of some particular requirements (such as 
evidence of a search for alternatives to the use of live animals).126 As 
noted, the other special protections that the AWA grants in particular 
to dogs and primates are for exercise for dogs and attention to 
psychological well-being for primates. Both of these protections are in 
regard to appropriate housing and caretaking and neither give any 
special reason to think that gene-editing interventions would 
contravene them. 
In sum, even though cats, dogs, and NHPs have specific standing 
in E.U. Directive 2010/63, as well as in the U.S. regulatory system, 
their use for scientific purposes is nonetheless allowed and only the 
use of NHPs is explicitly restricted in the European Union.127 Pigs do 
not receive special protection in either regulatory framework, though 
they are covered by the AWA.128 Against the background of the 
translatability crisis of animal research in general and rodent studies 
in particular, E.U. Directive 2010/63 does not, based on our analysis, 
present reasons to oppose a turn toward using cognitively higher-
developed animals over cognitively less-developed animals, as long as 
a sufficient scientific rationale for the experiment is given. As nothing 
in the U.S. regulations overall offers greater levels of protection of 
large animals, there is no reason to think any greater resistance to 
gene-edited large-animal models would occur in that setting. 
 
 124. See supra Section III.E.  
 125. 7 U.S.C. §	2132(g) (2012). 
 126. SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND ANIMALS, supra note 60, at 30; Karas & Silverman, 
supra note 82, at 339–40; Ernest D. Prentice, Gwenn S. F. Oki & Michael D. Mann, 
General Concepts of Protocol Review, in THE IACUC HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at 139, 
139–40. 
 127. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶	33, at 36 (“Non-human primates, 
dogs and cats should have a personal history file from birth covering their lifetimes in 
order to be able to receive the care, accommodation and treatment that meet their 
individual needs and characteristics.”). 
 128. §	2132(g). 
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V.  POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE U.S. AND E.U. 
FRAMEWORKS 
We have identified limited areas in which the gene editing of 
large-animal models will not be considered ethically viable under the 
regulations, primarily within the E.U. legislation. Examples include 
the use of NHPs that are not within the approved purposes of 
research or for which animals other than NHPs can be used with 
equal efficacy. Also, unacceptable uses will be found where the 
perceived research benefits do not outweigh the animal harm or 
where the animals will suffer beyond a very high maximal threshold 
(as might be the case for certain devastating genetic conditions). 
Further, it is clear from both U.S. and E.U. regulatory standards that 
large animals require species-appropriate housing, caretaking, and 
“enrichment,”129 as well as species-specific euthanasia methods.130 
However, these requirements are not specific to gene-edited animals, 
and since all large-animal species that are likely to be used for gene-
edited purposes are already in use in invasive biomedical research, 
these constraints likely will not limit their use for gene-editing 
purposes. 
In a sense, these conclusions are not surprising given that neither 
the U.S. nor the E.U. regulatory framework, despite being among the 
most stringent in the world, aims to manage overall trends in animal 
research from an ethical viewpoint. Indeed, neither contains any 
means to critically assess such trends. At the same time, as we have 
also pointed out, there are important differences between the two 
regulatory frameworks such that it is at least arguable that the E.U. 
framework grants research animals, in general, a higher moral status 
than in the U.S. framework. It may seem to follow from a greater 
emphasis on animal moral status that animals capable of greater 
suffering and more complex social, cognitive, and emotional 
capacities will be protected from highly invasive and/or harmful 
experiments. However, as we have discussed, even NHPs do not seem 
protected against being used in larger numbers to better model 
devastating human diseases in either regulatory framework.  
One conclusion could be that the higher moral status of research 
animals in the European Union has little significant practical 
importance in terms of the protection of research animals. Yet certain 
types of NHP research have received added scrutiny and have even 
 
 129. Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, annex III, sec. A(3.3)(b), at 56. 
 130. See AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, supra note 96, at 6–7. 
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been halted in the European Union and in Switzerland. In Bremen, 
Germany, for example, the license of a macaque researcher was not 
renewed because his work involving fixation of macaques in the 
primate chair to record their brains while performing simple tasks was 
deemed to be “too far from applications” and because “it is ethically 
not justifiable to inflict this kind of pain on animals for the generation 
of neurobiological basic knowledge.”131 However, the highest court in 
Germany later overturned this refusal to renew the project license.132 
A similar case happened in 2006 in Zurich when authorities declined 
to renew a license for primate work.133 The authorities ruled that the 
work, which had a goal to map the functional microcircuitry of the 
brain of macaques, offended the dignity of the animals and would not 
generate practical benefits in the foreseeable future.134 Decisions like 
these imply that a greater use of large-animal models may be 
perceived as justified only as long as the promise of translational 
efficiency is salient to those reviewing the research. 
While there are no features of the current regulatory guidance in 
the United States or the European Union that we identified as 
necessarily inhibiting a trend to greater use of gene-edited large-
animal models, there are broader ethical implications of such a trend 
that are critical to considering its overall acceptability. We raise these 
briefly here but note that they deserve much greater attention than 
we give them in the context of this Article, focused as it is on the 
regulatory implications of such a trend.  
One set of issues has to do with whether some genetic 
manipulations, for example brain enhancements, might themselves 
incur greater sentience and thus a more significant ability to suffer in 
large animals. This is a particularly salient concern for NHPs, whose 
 
 131. Herwig Grimm et al., The Road to Hell Is Paved with Good Intentions: Why 
Harm-Benefit Analysis and Its Emphasis on Practical Benefit Jeopardizes the Credibility of 
Research, 7 ANIMALS, no. 7090070, Sept. 11, 2017, at 1, 2 (translating 
Oberverwaltungsgericht der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, FREIE HANSESTADT BREMEN 
(Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.oberverwaltungsgericht.bremen.de/sixcms/detail.php?gsid=
bremen72.c.11099.de&asl=bremen72.c.11265 [https://perma.cc/V2BK-DMJA]); see also 
Quirin Schiermeier, German Authority Halts Primate Work, 455 NATURE 1159, 1159 
(2008). 
 132. Hristio Boytchev, Campaign Targeting Animal Experimenter Causes Uproar in 
Germany, SCIENCE (May 7, 2014, 4:45 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/05/
campaign-targeting-animal-experimenter-causes-uproar-germany [https://perma.cc/JQ4M-
HJXH]. 
 133. Alison Abbot, Basel Declaration Defends Animal Research, 468 NATURE 742, 742 
(2010). 
 134. Id. 
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cognitive capacities are already so similar to our own. Closely tied to 
this concern is the critique that the moral status implications of the 
E.U. legislation do not go far enough. On that view, it is not enough 
to grant harms to animals like dogs and primates a higher weight than 
harms to rodents in a harm-benefit analysis; rather, these animals 
should be granted a moral status such that they simply are not used in 
harmful animal research. Of course, if that is the case, then the move 
to gene-edited large-animal models will be blocked out of the gate. A 
related, but theoretically very different, approach would be to claim 
that it is simply not the case that the social, emotional, and cognitive 
needs of these larger mammals can be adequately met within the 
confines of a research facility. Should this empirical claim be proven 
true, and under the assumption that meeting those needs is a 
precursor to the ethical use of any animals, it may be argued as a 
matter of practical necessity that such animals should not be used. 
A final theoretical point falls along the lines of a utilitarian 
critique of the harm-benefit analysis within the E.U. regulatory 
framework. Opponents might argue that within the normative 
framework of E.U. Directive 2010/63, animal interests are discounted 
beyond what is ethically acceptable. This criticism is based on the fact 
that even the fairly remote promise of human benefit might justify 
quite serious actual harms to animals according to the current 
practices associated with harm-benefit analyses. Thus, a more 
balanced equitable consideration of harms and benefits will justify far 
less in the way of animal research generally, including the use of gene-
edited large-animal models. Of course, such an argument leaves 
completely open the idea that some uses of gene-edited large animals 
could well be justified, especially if they promise particularly 
compelling health advances for recalcitrant human diseases. 
The ethical concerns that may be raised with the greater use of 
gene-edited large animals in biomedical research largely fall outside 
the scope of the regulatory framework for animal research that we 
have discussed. However, there are important precursors to these 
potential concerns within the regulatory frameworks themselves, 
especially within the E.U. framework. For example, the idea of the 
requirement for a harm-benefit analysis as an ethical justification for 
animal research is a necessary step in moving toward a more 
equitable treatment of animal interests within such an analysis. 
Similarly, the idea that certain harms are out of bounds for sentient 
animals even if they may bear fruit scientifically is a conceptual step 
toward the idea that animals in research may have certain rights in 
regard to how they are utilized. Finally, the concern about species-
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specific housing, caretaking, social needs, etc., when taken to its 
logical endpoint, may lead to a concern that it is potentially 
impossible for animal confinement facilities to adequately meet 
complex social, emotional, and cognitive needs of certain types of 
animals (even more so if those animals are cognitively enhanced by 
genetic means). 
One way of seeing this set of issues is that, in so far as they sign 
onto the three Rs, and in particular to replacement as incrementally 
realizable, animal scientists generally agree that harmful animal use is 
less than ideal and that the ultimate goal ought to be ending the 
harmful use of sentient animals.135 Put in that way, the question 
resulting from the use of greater numbers of gene-edited large 
animals may be a question of what means we might be willing to 
endorse to achieve that broader goal of ending harm to sentient 
animals. If gene-edited large animals are such excellent models for 
humans that their use will bring a quicker end to the harmful use of 
animals in biomedicine overall, is that grounds for those uses? 
Alternatively, the use of NHPs has raised concerns due to their 
ethically salient similarities to humans. If genetically modified NHPs 
are such good models of human disease (because they are even more 
humanlike), then their use raises concerns akin to the uses of humans 
for these same kinds of experiments and raises the question whether 
they, by genetic modification, would reach a limit on permissible use 
independently of potential benefit. 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued that neither the U.S. nor E.U. regulatory 
frameworks offer guidance on a trend toward greater use of gene-
edited large animals in place of larger numbers of small-animal 
models. Moreover, we have suggested that the promise of greater 
gains in translation and efficiency are powerful forces that are likely 
to move the science community to embrace such trends in the name 
of a professional ethic that views animal use as justified mainly by its 
positive benefit. Further, the professional ethical framework 
governing animal research, the three Rs, itself contains internal 
tensions that make it incapable of offering significant guidance on this 
topic over and above the regulatory framework itself. This state of 
 
 135. This is reflected in the E.U. 2010/63 Directive’s ultimate goal of ceasing animal 
experimentation as soon as adequate nonanimal alternative methods are available. 
Council Directive 2010/63, supra note 9, pmbl. ¶	10, at 34. 
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affairs leads us to ask: Is the use of genetically modified large animals 
in order to realize the eventual goal of phasing out invasive animal 
research a step in the right direction? Alternatively, do increased uses 
of gene-edited large mammals like dogs, pigs, and NHPs undercut the 
very moral sensibilities that motivated this goal in the first place? This 
Article leaves this conundrum for our readers to consider. 
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